

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM			
	UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Dr. Clarke		JMC
2	General Graham		G
3		12/1	JAC
4			
5			
6			
	ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
	CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE
Remarks: The attached responds to Mr. Colby's request. The DCI expressly said that he wanted to send the attachments to Dr. Kissinger.			
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FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER			
			DATE
	UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET

SECRET

10 DEC 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Actions to Control Damaging Security Leaks

1. Attached is a proposed memorandum to Dr. Kissinger and members of the NSCIC prepared on the basis of the conference on this subject in your office on 5 December.

2. The material in paragraphs 4 - 7 is included primarily because only Dr. Kissinger will receive the attachments to the memorandum and it was thought the other NSCIC members should be given enough information to provide the flavor of what the attachments contain.

3. The information about costs in paragraph 9 is deliberately general since experience has indicated there is no really good way to assess the dollar costs of recent leaks. After the "Rose Garden incident" in the early 1960s when a published photograph of McGeorge Bundy clearly showed the COMINT codeword on the papers he was carrying, it was estimated that the complete change in the designator cost \$500,000. Codewords are now considered "disposable" according to [redacted] Special Assistant to the CIA SIGINT officer, and there is no basis for charging a particular cost to changes in codewords. The community has ignored the fact that the codeword "UMBRA" has several times appeared in news stories.

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Again, however, [redacted]

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25X1 [redacted] says there is no practicable way of putting a dollar cost on our efforts to compensate for this intelligence loss.

5. I recommend that you sign the attached memorandum to Dr. Kissinger and the NSCIC members and that you include a copy of this memorandum, along with the earlier one of 28 November on the same subject, when you send to the USIB principals the unclassified memorandum on this subject which the Office of Security is preparing.

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I personally disagree. If we can estimate the dollar costs of Soviet divisions, we can surely do this.

Daniel O. Graham
Major General, USA
D/DCI/IC

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505


MEMORANDUM FOR: The Chairman and Members of the NSCIC

SUBJECT: Actions to Control Damaging Security Leaks

REFERENCE: My memorandum, 28 November 1973, subject
as above, TS 205242/73)

1. The recent spate of unauthorized disclosures of sensitive intelligence in the public media poses a serious threat to our continued access to some important sources of information, and I am convinced that further action is necessary to protect our sources and methods.

2. Admittedly, the problem is not a new one, as is indicated by the materials at Tabs A and B.



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5. At Tab B is a chronology of official actions and correspondence related to unauthorized disclosure of intelligence materials. I think it is significant that over a period of years the President has, on four occasions, emphasized to members of his Cabinet and to heads of agencies the need to assure against leaks of sensitive information-- President Eisenhower on 23 May 1960, President Johnson on 3 December 1966 and 16 February 1968, and President Nixon on 21 December 1970.

6. President Nixon stated:

"I am becoming increasingly concerned about the disclosure in public media of classified information bearing upon important aspects of national security, particularly that which tends to jeopardize intelligence sources and methods. Such disclosures present a serious threat to our national interests and I am determined that the practice of releasing such information without proper authorization will be brought to an end."

7. Responding to President Nixon's memorandum, Mr. Helms reported on 17 February 1972 that:

"Each member of the USIB has now reported to me on his implementing actions. These actions include strengthening existing controls on classified material, reviewing indoctrination procedures, reducing the number of clearances, and similar constructive measures. Special attention has been given to establishing procedures whereby the appropriate intelligence chief is consulted whenever it is proposed to issue public statements which may reveal sensitive intelligence information. In these cases the intelligence chief is expected to assess the risks involved and to devise methods to protect the source of such information."

8. While these strengthened controls and indoctrination procedures may have reduced the risk of unauthorized disclosure, it is obvious that they do not go far enough.

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9. What those who leak classified information and those who publish it may not fully realize is that in addition to the risks to national security which their actions involve, the disclosures also can result in sizeable monetary costs to U.S. taxpayers. Such costs are difficult to measure, but the fact remains that disclosure of the manner in which certain information is acquired stimulates the target country to take new measures to insure against further U.S. access to data of the type which has been disclosed. To compensate for this, the intelligence community has to develop new capabilities, which may include quite expensive investment in new or improved equipment.

10. Somehow it is essential that we bring about a change in attitude on the part of those who are now disclosing sensitive intelligence information without authority and those who publish it without regard to what their actions mean, not only in cost to the security of the United States but also in monetary costs to the American taxpayer.

11. As one follow-on measure, I am having drafted a legislative proposal dealing with the protection of sensitive intelligence sources and methods. The purpose of this would be to strengthen existing legislation to improve the chances of conviction where there has been an unauthorized disclosure. Hopefully such a statute would act as a deterrent.

12. I also am preparing materials for dissemination to USIB principals, with a request that they once again call the problem to the attention of their personnel, reminding them of their responsibilities for the protection of intelligence.

13. It would be most helpful if, at meetings and conferences which you attend, each of you would make the point that continuation of the present situation in which sensitive intelligence is disclosed without consideration as to what the costs may be, is not tolerable.

W. E. Colby

Attachments: (for Chairman, NSCIC only)

Tab A

Tab B

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